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1. Introduction
  As the world economy is integrated and as economies with different 
styles from Western countries, uch as post-war Japan and Korea, attain high 
economic performance, the importance of the study =on diversity of 
economies i recognized. In the past decade, the diversity of economic 
systems observed among countries or between different points of time is 
studied theoretically. This line of study has been developed in a systematic 
way and called Comparative Institutions Analysis (CIA). A lot of literature in
CIA explains the rationale hidden behind the Japanese management system 
which has not been satisfactorily understood, e.g., "lifetime mployment" and 
 "enterprise unionism" in the employer-employee r lationship, "seniority 
pay" in wage structure and promotion system and "mutual stockholding" in
corporate governance (as an extensive survey, see Aoki (1995)). 
  Aoki (1996) claims the importance of analyzing the economy as a system 
consisting ofmutually complementary factors. By doing so, we can think that 
these arrangements have the rationality inthat hey are equilibrium strategies 
supporting each other, then there is no incentive for agents to change only 
one of them. And he regards not only the arrangements listed above but also 
market, money, legal and political ruling by state, contracts, social 
conventions and norms as the institutional arrangements supported as 
mutually complementary equilibrium strategies. But we distinguish the 
institutional arrangements which are the obligatory constraints to the 
behavior of agents which cannot change without formal legal procedure from 
those which can be chosen by any single agent under these constraints. We 
call the latter informal -constraints foragents ocial norms and conventions. 
  The main purpose of this paper is to study why and how such diversity 
emerges and such variety kinds of social conventions and norms are 
maintained over time. In the conventional studies in CIA, such diversity is 
regarded as a consequence of a variety of historically given physical 
conditions like endowments, production technology and preference. On the 
other hand, in our analysis, we regard it as a consequence of coordination of
choices among agents and as being determined by economic performance,
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expectation a d stock of information given physical conditions.' That is, we 
regard the relationship among agents and that among organizations or 
societies as being constraints on decision-making of agents. To this end, we 
take a game theoretical pproach. According to Schelling (1960), game 
theory is the theory of the inter-dependence decision which ranges over a 
spectrum with games of pure conflict and games of pure coordination as 
opposite limits.2 A typical example of the former is well known as 
 " prisoner's dilemma " game in which defection strictly dominates 
cooperation for both players. We shall be concern with exactly or nearly pure 
coordination problems. 
  This paper consists of four sections. And the outline of each section is as 
follows. Section 2 and 3 are devoted to comparison of interpretations of 
social convention and norm by economists and game theorists with that by 
other social scientists. A social convention and norm have been studied not 
only by economists but also other social scientists and there has been much 
difference between their definitions. Specifically, economists regards 
economic phenomena observed in the real economy as consequences of 
agents' choice subject to physical and institutional constraints, e.g., 
endowment, technology, market power and so on. And they interpret social 
conventions and norms in the same way. On the other hand, other social 
scientists define it as orientations by which individuals are guided. That is, 
they interpret them to be constraints on agents' decision-making. Wecall the 
former "equilibrium analysis" and the latter "philosophycal study" . 
  Section 4 and 5 are devoted to presentation f two analytical tools which 
play the key role in our analysis. First one is the Folk Theorem in the theory 
of repeated games. This states that efficient cooperation can be supported as 
an equilibrium outcome in non-cooperative games. 
 Second one is the concept of evolutionarily stability in the theory of 
evolutionary game. The fact that evolutionarily stable equilibrium is Nash 
equilibrium is called by Samuelson and Zhang (1992) and Samuelson (1994)
' Throughout this paper
, we assume that all agents are boundedly rational in the sense defined. Then 
the entire history and the whole structure of economy are not supposed to be common knowledge and 
in decision-making they exchange necessary information and form expectation about economic 





stability or convergence implies Nash theorem" and a version of the Folk 
Theorem of evolutionary games. 
 Section 6 is devoted to presentation of the key concept in our analysis 
which is "complementarity" . Lastly, section 7 is devoted to pointing out 
some problems in the conventional analysis and presentation of the outline of 
our analysis in the following chapters.
 2 A Social Norm ; Philosophycal Study and Equilibrium 
Analysis
2.1 A Social Norm
  In this subsection, we discuss how a social norm should be interpreted in
our analysis and how it has been sustained by the member of the society. We 
begin with discussing the first question. Elster(1989) and Matui (1996) argue 
that in the social sciences, different disciplines have different definitions of 
social norm and there is discrepancy between the interpretation f social 
norm by economists and that by sociologists. On the one hand, sociologists 
define it as an orientation by which individuals are guided. And this 
orientation becomes a social norm when it is shared by most members in a 
society. It is interpreted as a constraint on agents' decision-making and 
usually induces an inefficient outcome. 
  Then, why do agents obey the norms in spite of their inefficiency. 
Elster(1989) gives a reason for it with the following two concepts, external 
and internal sanctions.3 Heargues that norm-guided behavior is supported by 
the threat of social sanctions that make it rational to obey the norms. And the 
sanctions are performed because of the fear of being sanctioned. However, in 
many cases, agents conform to norms even if their violation of norms is 
unobserved and not exposed to sanctions because they have feelings of guilt, 
anxiety and shame. For the reason, they would internalize the norms and 
obey them. If the punishment is only a label attached to -the deviant, nobody 
will feel shame when one is caught. This observation implies that agents are
3 See pp. 104-105.
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not engaged in so called cost-benefit analysis, nor do they pay too much 
attention to the action's consequence. These feelings can be sufficient 
internal sanction to make them follow a social standard independently of the 
current reaction of others. 
  On the other hand, economists sometimes define it as an equilibrium of 
games describing the economic activities in the society. Economists regards 
economic phenomena observed in the real economy as consequences of 
agents' choice subject o physical and institutional constraints. And they 
usually assume rational (or at least boundedly rational) agent whose behavior 
choice is made in a goal-oriented way and always in his self-interest. As a 
consequence, they examine the rationale hidden behind the social norm to 
which all agents conform. Economists pointed out that norms have the 
following functions in the society. 
 (1) It helps agents to achieve individual or social welfare. 
 (2) it -helps agents to prevent market failure and coordination failure. 
 (3) It helps agents to economize on decision cost.
  The difference between two interpretations discussed here can be simply 





Social Norm Constraint 
Efficiency Usually Inefficient 
                   Figure 1.
Equilibrium Analysis
Rational (or at least Boundedly 
       Rational) 
       Goal-Oriented 
    Outcome (Equilibrium) 
      Usually Efficient
 Many economists have made an attempt to bridge the gap by establishing 
either that social norms are rational as efficient means to achieve individual 
and social welfare, or that social norms make it rational to confirm to them 
by giving agents incentive to do -so. The latter attempt made by Kandori 
(1992) and Okuno-Fujiwara and Postalewaite(1995) is presented in the 
following subsection.
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2.2 A Social Norm as an Coordination Mechanism among 
Agents in Games
   In this subsection, we present a model where following the prevailing 
standard behavior can be equilibrium attained by agents who pursue their 
own self-interest and whose behavior are goal-oriented. That is Kandori 
(1992) and Okuno-Fujiwara and Postalewaite(1995)'s social norm model 
which defines a social norm as a ,combination of a transition mapping of 
agent's tatus level and a social standard ofbehavior corresponding to the 
status level. If the status level is changed based on his behavior choice in the 
previous period in the way that he low status level is attached to those who 
deviate from the prevailing standard behavior and the high level to those who 
follow it, a transition mapping works as an information processing 
mechanism fortransmitting formation about agents' past deviations. And if 
the social standard behavior p escribes defect for those who meet those who 
deviate from the social standard and cooperation forthose who meet hose 
who follow it, the standard behavior works as an enforcing mechanism of 
standard behavior and facilitates coordination among them through 
community enforcement. Community enforcement is a way of enforcing a 
certain social agreement by using punishment by all members of society who 
are not necessarily the victims of an agent's deviation. It does not require the 
whole structure of game and the entire history of play to be common 
knowledge because a label attached toeach agent represents hi  behavior 
choice in the previous period. 
   Under these mechanisms, it is shown that he Folk Theorem holds in 
random atching game ( for the detail of the Folk Theorem, see section 4). 
 In the continuum state space version of Okuno-Fujiwara and 
Postalewaite(1995) model, the games F'0(8) consists of stage games which 
are defined as follows.
(1)The set of players The set of players i a finite set I = {1,2,. ..  n) . 
(2)The set of strategies available to player i The set of strategies available 
to player i isa compact interval t,1whose a; generic element is denoted 
by a; . 
(3)The set of statuses of player i The set of statuses of player i is a compact
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  interval X, = Ex; , Y, whose g neric element is denoted by x;.Suppose that 
  this statuses of agents are determined bysome rule according to outcome 
  of play in the precedent period. This rule is described by a transition 
   mapping r,: A x X -+ X,. 
 (4)The payoff to player i The payoff .r, to player i is represented by a 
  real-valued function defined over the product space A x X; 
   In this setting, the status level x, is attached toevery player according to 
 his strategy a, in the previous period. If player i 's status level is x, and its 
transition mapping r, is as in the definition and the distribution of other 
 players status level is changed according to a transition function 
 P , (x-,;a, x-)over time, then a transition function of status levels in the whole 
society is given by 
                     P-,(x1 _;a,x-,) if r,(a,x) = x,'            P(je; a, X) = 
0 if r, (a, x) ~ x,' 
 Given this, the agents' status levels in each period follow the following 
Markov process. 
                  gt11 = j x P(x'; a,x)q, (dx) 
 Since per-period payoff ;r, to player i is a function of strategies a taken by 
players and his status level x,:, his value function is of the following form. 
         vz'(x,a;i,p)= (1-S)ir=(x=,a,,a-,)+5 jxvO(x',a,,a-,)q(x';a,x ,' 
 A solution in this game characterized bya Markov strategy is calculated 
by means of the ordinary dynamic programming. It is defined as follows. 
Definition 2.l (Norm - Equilibrium Okuno-Fujiwara and Postdewaite 
(1995)) 
   A triplet (f3*, p*) _(r*(y*ps)is , , called a norm equilibrium of if 
(a) p*is stationary given /3*,
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(b) for all i €1 ,for all x; E X and for all a, EA,, 
                  v-*(x,opt*'/*'p*)'v`(x,a,,l(, p*) 
 Condition (a) requires that the status distribution in the equilibrium state is 
stationary. And condition (b) require that strategy profile constituting a norm 
equilibrium must satisfy an ordinary equilibrium condition. 
 As discussed above, the most striking feature of this model is that this 
analyzes the norm-guided behavior in the framework of equilibrium analysis. 
And this characterizes norm-guided behavior taken by players who pursue 
their own self-interest as an equilibrium behavior. In that sense, this 
reconciles two approaches discussed above. This, however, does not define 
a social norm itself as an equilibrium behavior. Instead, this introduce the 
concept of norm equilibrium which is attained under the .guidance of social 
norm.
3. A Social Convention ; Philosophycal Study and 
Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 A Social Convention
1
  In this section, we discuss how a convention has been interpreted by 
social scientists and how it is formalized by the equilibrium concept. We 
address the first question in 3.1 and second question in 3.2. In the case of a 
social convention, unlike the case of a social norm, there is no conflict 
between the interpretation of equilibrium analysis and of philosophycal study. 
Roughly speaking, both of them define it as a pattern of behavior which is 
spontaneously chosen by agents on the basis of their belief about what the 
others' will do. According to Lewis (1969), a convention is a pattern of 
behavior, that is customary, and self-enforcing. Everyone conforms, 
everyone xpects others to conform, and everyone wants to conform given 
that everyone lse conforms. In this interpretation, a social convention is the 
outcome learning in a repeated strategic interaction is ultimately afunction of 
preference and expectation of agents. 
  To define it exactly, we use the following five concepts, i.e., rationality,
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inductive standard, background information, common knowledge and 
expectation. As for rationality, economists assume that agent's preference 
can be represented by a complete and transitive preference relation over 
possible outcomes.` They also assume that agents' inductive standard can be 
described by an optimization calculation and Baynesian updating. And they 
assume that agents have complete information orreceive some public signal. 
  As shown in the above Lewis' definition convention is supported by 
high-order expectations, i.e., everyone conforms to the convention because 
he expects everyone else to conform to it because very one of them expects 
everyone else to conform to it, and so on. For these high-order expectation to 
be consistent with each other, rationality, inductive standard, background 
information of each agent should be common knowledge in the sense of 
Aumann (1,976). That is, everyone knows that everyone else know about his 
rationality, inductive standard and background information and everyone else 
know that he knows that everyone lse know that about his rationality, 
inductive standard and background information, and so on. And for them to 
be common knowledge, there must be some base for it. As simple xamples 
of it, we can think of agreement, salience and precedent. 
   Here, let us introduce Lewis (1969)'s definition of social convention.5
Definition (Social Convention) A regularity inthe behavior of members ofa 
population when they are agents in a recurrent situation isa convention if and 
only if it is common knowledge in the population that, in almost all instance 
of the situation among members ofthe population, 
(1) almost everyone conforms to it; 
(2) almost everyone expects almost everyone else to conforms to it; 
(3) almost everyone has the almost same preferences regarding all possible 
combinations of actions; 
(4) almost everyone prefers that any one more conform to it , on condition 
that almost everyone conform to it; 
(5) almost everyone prefers that any one more conform to some possible
4Agent's preference r lation is compl
ete if any x, y x _> y or x <_ y . And it is transitive if
x> y and y> z implies x> z. 
5 To be precise
, Lewis (1969) provides the four definitions of social convention. And this is his final 
definition, see pp. 18.
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regularity in the behavior of the population in a situation, on condition 
that almost everyone conform to it. This regularity is such that almost no 
one in almost any instance of a situation among members of the 
population could conform both to a social convention and to it.
  Third requirement is met in most cases. Agents' expectations about other 
agents' actions in second, forth and fifth requirements can be formed 
appropriately under the assumption of common knowledge. This implies that 
there must exist a convention supported as an equilibrium outcome based on 
a reasonable belief on other agents' choices in games. Note, however that 
convention should be strictly distinguished from norm because there is no 
sanction against not confirming to it. But convention is more formal than 
habit because convention is adopted by members of a society, not private 
one.
3.2 A Social Convention as an Equilibrium of Games
  Young (1993) has proposed a game theoretical account of conventions 
according to which a convention is broadly defined as a Nash equilibrium. 
To analyze reasoning process of players, he uses adaptive process as follows. 
In the process, players are boundedly rational in that they observe limited 
size of sample of plays from recent ime periods and they have only finite 
memory. And he defines a convention as an absorbing steady state supported 
as a strict Nash equilibrium in pure strategy in the game. Incompleteness of
sample creates enough stochastic variability to prevent the process from 
becoming stuck in suboptimal cycles. Finite memory allows past 
miscoordinations tobe forgotten forever. 
  In his analysis, he restricts attention to the long-run equilibrium selected 
in the presence of random perturbation. To this end, mutations who do not 
know nothing about past plays of the game are introduced every period. He 
shows that continual mutations which occur along the dynamic path at the 
individual level can select a risk dominant equilibrium as a long run 
equilibrium. This result is shown also by Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) 
and Ellison (1993) independently.
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4. Folk Theorem and Repeated Games
  In the following three sections, we discuss useful concepts for our 
analysis by which norms and conventions are characterized. By doing so, we 
present heoretical implications of norms and conventions as equilibria. First, 
the present section discusses the theory of repeated games and the most 
striking result in 'that field, i.e., the well-known "Folk theorem". Second, the 
next section discusses the theory of evolutionary games and the concept of 
 "b
ounded rationality" in that context. Lastly, we discuss the concept of 
complementarity. The basic idea of repeated game theory -is that people may 
behave quite differently toward those with whom they expect o have a long-
term relationship from toward those with whom they expect no future 
interaction. And the Folk Theorem provides the rigorous foundation to this 
idea. The Folk Theorem states that if the single-period game is repeated 
infinitely, efficiency will be attained with supergame quilibria. Precisely, all 
feasible and individually rational payoffs can be attained as an equilibrium 
payoff. This result has been studied by many theorists under a variety of 
conditions, e.g., Friedman(1971), Benoit and Krishuna(1985), Fudenberg 
and Maskin(1986) and Abreu (1988). As usual, we begin our argument by 
presenting the framework of argument in this section. 
 Consider the repeated games F'0(46) with stage games r = {I,4,,t,8)                                                , 
defined as follows.
 (1) The set ofplayers The set of players i a finite set I = {1,2,...,n} 
 (2) The set of strategies available to player i The set of strategies 
available to player i is a finite set A, _ {a' ;,...a"'} whose generic element is 
denoted bya, .
 (3) The payoff to player i The payoff ir, to player i is represented by a 
real-valued function defined over the product space f ,cN Awhose generic 
element is denoted bya = (a1,. ..a„) . 
 (4) Common discount rate 8 E (0,1) 
 (5) The set of feasible and individually rational payoffs The set of 
   feasible payoffs i  defined byF(A) =_ {r(a)Ia i = } where the payoff 
    vector is sr = (ir1,... ir,). The minmax payoff of player i in r is
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v, = mina_t cq-4 maxat GA ?1'i (a,' , a-,) . The payoff vector is individually 
rational if for all i , ;r, > vi . Then the set of feasible and individually 
rational payoffs is defined by
D(A) = €x(a) E F(A)I rri ? vi fort/ i c- N).
Note that player i can obtain at least v, by switching to his best response and 
               max 4 ?ri'(a,,  i)> mina 4 max CA, 7ri (a, a_1) =vi 
from which it follows that any equilibrium of r yields player i a payoff at 
least 1; . 
  Let sk be the strategy profile at stage k with sk = (at,.. a~) where 
superscript represents the stage and subscript represents players. The history 
available toplayer i is denoted by hk = (s, ... st) and the set of histories by H k . 
And the strategy profile in supergame r k is called behavior strategy and is a 
function from the set of histories to the set of pure strategies, i.e., 
sk :Hk --+ A . If games are with perfect recall, then we can restrict our 
attention to behavioral strategy by Khun's Theorem. And we define the 
solution concept in behavior strategy for supergame r k .
Definition 4.1 (Subgame Perfect Equilibrium) The strategy profile sk is a 
subgame perfect equilibrium of I F4 ak is a Nash equilibrium of ro for any 
hk E H .
 Moreover, we define two sets of equilibrium payoffs in rk corresponding 
to two equilibria, i.e. Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium, as 
follows,
NE(Fk) = {7z; E D(A)f 7r; (s') = max.,,-A, ,r(s,, s'i) forvi e N and ai E Ai I
and
SPE(I'k) Ir' E D( A)I,r.k~(a'*) = m x Yr k(a. ' ) forlli e N an hk EH k .                       t : aj =_.4t i t i
  In the Folk Theorem, a particular feasible and individually rational payoff 
can be supported as an equilibrium payoff by using a punishment on a
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deviator from the strategy inducing it as its payoff. For the purpose, we need 
to impose one of the following assumptions on games.
Assumption 4.1 D(A) has a nonempty interior.
This assumption requires that for all d in D(A) and all e, there xists an 
element d' in D(A) such that lid ---d'1J <,6, and d' is in the interior of D(A). 
This is used to prove that a particular payoff can be supported as a perfect 
equilibrium payoff. In this case, the punishment which is used to deter a 
deviation must be a equilibrium strategy. Then if it is costly for the punisher 
to punish the deviator, he must get a reward. But the reward the punisher 
gets must not be a reward for the deviator. For the reason, the dimension of 
D(A) must equal to the number of players n. This condition is called the full-
dimensiomality condition.
Assumption 4.2 For all i E N there exists e(i) in E(r') such that e(i) > v; .
This is used to prove that a-particular payoff can be asymptotically supported 
as a Nash equilibrium payoff of finitely repeated games. To do so, profitable 
deviations at the end of the games must be excluded. There must be an 




 For all i e N there xists e(i) and 
D(A) has an nonempty interior.
f(i) inE(F)such that
This is used to prove that a particular payoff can be asymptotically supported 
as a perfect equilibrium payoff of finitely repeated games. To this end both of 
the above ideas (1) playing an equilibrium strategy at the end of the game 
and (2) rewarding the punishers are employed. Then, this is the most 
restrictive assumption f all. 
 With the above preparation, we can present the ordinary Folk Theorem.
Definition .2 (the Folk Theorem 1.) For any normal form game, the set 
of subgame perfect outcomes (and, hence, the set of Nash outcomes) ofthe
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supergame r with discounting converges the set of feasible and individually 
rational outcomes of the one-shot game as the discount tends to one, i.e.,
1im6y, SPE(r01 s))= D(A) .
Definition 4.3 (the Folk Theorem 2.) For any normal form game, the set of 
subgame perfect of outcomes (and, hence, the set of Nash outcomes) ofthe 
k -fold repetition of r converges to the set of feasible and individually 
rational outcomes ofthe one-shot game as k tends to infinity, i.e.,
IiMk-+aoSPE(rk (05 )) = D (A) -
 Unfortunately, the well-known Folk theorems imply that, in general, the 
set of perfect equilibria is vast, all feasible and individually rational payoffs 
can be attained as an equilibrium payoff. 
 Friedman(1971) shows the Folk Theorem 1 by using the Cournot-Nash 
punishment after a single deviation. Benoit and Krishuna(1985) show that 
under the assumption 3 the Folk Theorem 2 holds for finite repetitions 
provided that he underlying game has at least 2 Nash equilibrium payoffs for 
each player. Fudenberg and Maskin(1986) show under the assumption I and 
the full-dimensionality condition that the Folk Theorem I holds. Abreu 
(1988) presents the simple strategy combination which supports any 
subgame perfect equilibrium path and yields any subgame perfect 
equilibrium payoff, called simple penal codes. 
  Moreover, this result holds under a variety of situations. Fudenberg, 
Kreps and Levine (1990) show that the Folk Theorem holds in the case 
where the games are played by long-run and short-run players. In this case 
every short-run player plays one-shot best response to the strategies of the 
long-run players. Then we can be reduced to the case with only long run 
players. Kandori (1992) shows that he Folk Theorem holds in the situation 
where a game is played by overlapping generations of players. Even if all 
players are finitely-lived and are replaced by successors, if there are 
sufficient interactions between one generations of players and the next and if 
the overlapping periods are long enough, every mutually beneficial outcome
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can be supported as a perfect. equilibrium. As discussed above, Kandori 
(1992) and Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995) show that the Folk 
Theorem holds in the situation where players are paired with partners 
randomly drawn from a population to play the game and change their 
partners over time.
5. Evolutionary Games and Bounded Rationality
5.1 the Basic Framework and Static Justification of ESS
 In this section, we introduce the -solution concepts within the framework of 
evolutionary game and discuss the relationship between the ordinary solution 
concepts in non-cooperative game theory and them. Specifically, we first 
discuss the relationship between the concept of the evolutionary stable state 
(ESS) proposed by Maynard Smith(1982) and that of traditional non-
cooperative equilibrium concepts, Nash equilibrium by (Nash(1950,1951)), 
perfect equilibrium by (Selten (1975)), and proper equilibrium by (Myerson 
(1978)). And then we present he equivalence of the limiting point of 
evolutionary process to ESS in a special case. This topic is concerning with 
the role that evolutionary process plays in the study of equilibrium 
refinement. That is, whether itcan rule out intuitively implausible outcomes. 
First of all, we begin our discussion by presenting the basic framework of 
game in a conventional way. Here, we suppose simple two-player symmetric 
game consisting of the following components. 
 (1)The set of players The set of players is a finite set I = {1,2} 
 (2)The set of strategies available to player i The set of strategies 
available to player i is a finite set A, = {Cl?.. l ,  am) whose g neric element is 
denoted by a, .
 (3)The payoff to player i The payoff ,c, to player i is represented by a 
   real-valued function defined over the product space fl i=1,2 A whose 
   generic element is denoted bya = (a, , a,). 
 (4) The set of mixed strategies of .player i The set of mixed strategies e,
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    is the set of probability distributions over the set of pure strategies A, 
    whose elements sum to 1. 
                    A, A. --). [O,iJtY ", z; =1} 
   In this setting, the average payoff to player i from choosing pure 
strategy a, is given by 
                  Et (a= , z)= I m1 z~?h (a1, a). 
   When, the average payoff to player i from choosing mixed strategy z, is 
given by 
                      E,(z,,z1)_ 1_lz,ir,(a,,a, 1. 
   With this preparation, the first solution concept is introduced as follows .
Definition 5.1 (Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS)) 
 A mixed strategy z, is an ESS of the symmetric game if it satisfies the 
equilibrium condition 
(1) if 'E A, then E(z, ,z1) >_ E(z', , z1) 
(2) if z, # Z', and E(z,,z1) = E(z', , z1) , then E(z,,z'1) > E(z', , z'1) .
  Condition (1) requires that if z, is an ESS, then z is a symmetric Nash 
equilibrium. And condition (2) requires that ESS z, is a stable strategy 
against mutations. Note that there exist the following six underlying 
assumptions on games for defining ESS.6 
(1) there is a large, random-mixing population 
(2) this population is monomorphic 
(3) there is asexual reproduction 
(4) mixed strategies can exist and do breed true 
(5) the individuals involve in pairwise contests only 
(6) contest is symmetric and static
  Evolutionary stability is essentially a condition that here be no profitable 
entry opportunities given the actions of the incumbent population. When 
pairs of players from a single population are randomly, repeatedly and 
anonymously paired to play a particular two person symmetric game, 
evolutionary stability provides a justification for equilibrium entirely
6 See van Danune (1987)pp.218.
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different from those advanced in traditional game theory. 
  The results of characterization of ESS are stated hereafter. First result is 
a characterization of ESS. This states that the strategy profile which is the 
only best response against itself must be ESS. In this case, the best response 
against itself for each player is singleton.
Fact 5..I If (zI ,z2 ) is strict equilibrium, then zi is an ESS. 7
 The next result by Haigh (1975) determines the number of ESS. This 
states that the number of ESS is at most finite. However, This does not say 
that the set of ESS For a particular game is nonempty. A simple case where 
the set of ESS is nonempty is 2 x 2 symmetric matrix games with at least one 
strict equilibrium. As typical examples of interest, we can think of games 
with a dominant strategy equilibrium, pure coordination games and games 
with a unique symmetric equilibrium which is in mixed strategies.
Fact 5.2 The number of ESS is f nite (but possibly zero).
Fact 5.3 If [bfr,] is a 2 x 2 ffitness matrix, i.e., 
    ;ri (a,, a1) = b11, ;r2 (a1, a;) = b12 , ir,(a2 , a1) = b21 and ;r, (a2 a2) =b 
                                                                   22 
with bl, :# bY1 and b12 #k..' then [b,,] has an ESS.
  With notations in this fact, the above examples are characterized as 
follows. Games with a dominant strategy equilibrium is defined by the 
inequalities (b11 - b21 X b22 - l2) < 0 and pure coordination games by b11 > b,1 ,
kn> b12 and games with a unique symmetric equilibrium which is in mixed 
strategies by b11 <b2111 b22 <b12 . 
  Next, we present the relation between ESS and the solution concepts of
conventional g me theory. First, we provide the relation between ESS and 
the perfect equilibrium proposed by Selten (1975). This is one of the most 
widely accepted refinements of Nash equilibrium. The basic idea behind the 
perfectness i  that each player with a small probability makes mistake. This 
implies that every pure strategy is chosen with a small probability. The next
See van Damme (1987) pp219.
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result states that every ESS must be a perfect equilibrium. This implies that 
ESS is a refinement of Nash egiulibrium.
Definition 5. Z (Perfect Equilibrium (Selten (1975)) An equilibrium z of r 
is a perfect equilibrium of r if z is a limit point of a sequence {z(7i)}g, of 
perturbed strategies with 
             E,(z(-?))' E,(z(q)/ _'(q)) 
for all rl .
Fact 5.4 If z, is an ESS, then (z, , z2) is a perfect equilibrium.
  Second, we provide the relation between ESS and the proper equilibrium 
proposed by Myerson (1978). This is also a refinement of Nash equilibrium 
concept. And the relationship between these facts is provided by fact 5.6.
Definition 5.3 (Proper Equilibrium (Myerson (1978)) An equilibrium z(e) 
of r is an 6-proper equilibrium of r if z(e) is completely mixed and 
satisfies 
      if E, (z(e) l k) > E, (z(e) / 1) ,then zk (e) <_ sr`(E) for all i, k, l . 
z is a proper quilibrium if z is a limit point of a sequence 4z(e)}ego if z(e) is
an e -proper equilibrium of r.
Fact 5.5 If z, is an ESS, then (z, z) is a proper equilibrium.
Fact 5.6 (Myerson (1978) For any finite game in normal form, the set of ' 
proper equilibria is a nonempty subset of the set of perfect equilibria.
  Note that ESS is a solution concept in static games. For our purpose of 
analyzing formation and sustenance of convention and norm through the 
repeated interaction over time, we must justify the concept of ESS in 
dynamical setting. This is argued in the following section.
-17-
5.2 Dynamic Justification of ESS ; the Selection Dynamics
  In this part, we discuss the relationship between ESS and the limiting 
point of evolutionary dynamic process. The results in this subsection and 
those in the previous ubsection together show evolutionary process based 
on the principle that the fittest survive can select reasonable outcome from 
the game theoretical point of view. This is important from not only the 
theoretical but also practical point of view because this is concerning with 
explanatory power of evolutionary theory. First one is the problem of 
equilibrium refinement. This is the problem whether evolutionary process 
can rule out intuitively implausible outcomes and predict only plausible 
outcomes. To do so, let us define the evolutionary process whose steady 
states have relation with ESS formally. 
 The dynamical system considerd here is called selection dynamics (see 
Nachbar (1990), Samuelson and Zhang (1992)).
Definition 5.4 (Selection Dynamics) 
For 0,: e i -+ e; , the systems given by t = 0 (zi) are continuous selection 
dynamics if they satisfy the following three conditions. 
(1) Lipschitz Continuity For any Z,, Z,i E of , there exists a real number k 
  such that 
                 fcE(z,)i - O(z1) kzi - z}i I. 
(2) Forward invariance If ;, is the solution path from z,,, E e; , then 
                   0(zi) >_ 0 if and only if zit > 0. 
(3) Relative monotonicity For any positive z; , z' i E e i with zit ? z' it , 
I 
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Definition 5.5 (Steady State) 
  zit is a steady state of dynamics ?it = O(zit) if it is a fixed point, i.e., 
 \zi *) = 0. And itis asymptotically stab eif ithas ome n ighborhood N,(zi' ) 
such t at zit --> zi` as t -* oo whenever zit E N6(zi:)
  The relationship between the limit point of evolutionary process and 
ordinary Nash equilibrium was established for many models. This result is
-18-
called "convergence or stability implies Nash" theorem and interpreted by
Samuelson (1994) as a version of Folk theorem of evolutionary game. 
Nachbar (1990) shows that if a dynamic process satisfies monotonicity 
condition, then a limiting outcome of a converging process must be a Nash 
equilibrium for symmetric games. Samuelson and Zhang (1992) proved the 
same result for asymmetric games. Friedman (1990) proved the same result 
under the weaker assumption called compatibility. Here, we restrict our 
attention the results obtained for a special case of selection dynamics called 
replicator dynamics (hereafter RD. See Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988)). If 
the average payoffs from choosing a particular pure strategy a, and from 
choosing a mixed strategy are given as in the previous ubsection, then the 
RD are given by
zz = "fzi/E(a,,zJ) - E(Z1,z;)].
 As for the relationship between the limit point of the RD and ESS, the 
following result is obtained. This result is obtained by Hofbauer, Schuster 
and Sigmund (1979). This states that ESS is sufficient condition for the 
strategy profile to be asymptotically stable under the RD.
Fact 5.7 Let z be an ESS, then the state is an asymptotically stable 
equilibrium of 'the RD.
   The following two facts provide the relationship between steady state of 
the RD and Nash equilibrium. The first result states that Nash equilibrium is 
sufficient for the strategy profile to be a steady state. But it is not necessary. 
The second fact presents the additional condition for the steady state to be 
Nash equilibrium.
Fact 5.8 Let z defines a symmetric Nash equilibrium, then it is a steady 
state of the RD. The converse need not be true.
Fact 5.9 Let z be an asymptotically stable equilibrium of the RD, then z 
is a Nash equilibrium.
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 The facts presented above are useful for us to characterize a social 
convention obtained as an equilibrium within the framework of evolutionary 
games. The reminder of this subsection, we briefly discuss the problem of 
equilibrium selection studied by Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), Young 
(1993) and Ellison (1993) and so on. This is the problem whether 
evolutionary process elect a unique outcome in consistent ways. The key 
concepts for equilibrium selection are proposed by Harsanuy and 
Seiten(1988). It is defined for the two strict equilibrium points.
Definition (the Risk Dominance Equilibrium) A strict equilibrium z of r 
is risk dominates the other strict equilibrium z' of r if z satisfies
E(z) - E(z /,z) > E(z) - E(z'/z; ').
  Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) show that continual mutations which 
occur along the dynamic path at the individual level can select risk dominant 
equilibrium as a long run equilibrium. And Young (1993), Ellison (1993) 
Their results inspire the study of equilibrium selection in the context of 
stochastic evolutionary game in the past five years.
5.3 Evolutionary Interpretation of Bounded Rationarity
  As early as 1950's Simon (1955,1957) proposed the concept of 
"bo
unded rationality" . He hypothesized that economic agents perform 
limited searches and accept he first satisfactory decision rather than they 
perform exhaustive searches over all possible decisions and pick the best. 
This hypothesis was called "satisfying hypothesis" and had a large impact 
on economics. It, however, was not analyzed in a rigorous way. Instead, in 
1970's, game theorists pursued the rationality of agents and proposed a 
variety of solution concepts requiring strong rationality to prescribe a 
plausible strategy, e.g., perfect equilibrium, Baynesian equilibrium and so 
on. Recently, game theorists have cast doubt on the assumption that 
economic agents are completely rational so that they can exploit any 
information about the whole structure and future state of the economy . 
And they formalize the idea by introducing the concepts of evolution and
-20-
learning into game theory. 
  The interpretations of bounded rationality inthe context of evolution or 
learning in game theory are as follows. 8 
(1) Players ignore strategic considerations regarding the future or do not 
take into account the long run implications of their strategy choices. Or, 
they ignore the fact that other players are also engaged in a dynamic 
learning process as they do (myopia). 
(2) Players are too naive to perform an optimization calculation over all 
possible alternatives no matter how high the resulting expected future 
payoffs are (native) . Instead, they accept some satisfactory decision they 
can easily make. 
(3) Players gradually learn opponents' behavior through repeated 
interaction, e.g., player's observation is imperfect. Even .though they are 
rational players with perfect foresight there is significant inertia (inertia), 
e.g. , changing one's strategy iscostly. 
  Based on these interpretations, many learning models are provided, 
e.g., dynamical process with Darwinian property (Kandori, Mailath and 
Rob (1993) and Ellison (1993)), adaptive play with mistakes (Young 
(1993)) and learning models by Ca~nnning (1992) and so on.
6. Strategic and Institutional Complementarity
   In this section, we discuss the concept of "complementarity" which is 
the key concept in the study of the coordination of choices of behavior 
among agents. When institutional arrangements are chosen as equilibrium 
strategies which are mutually complementary in the social game, element 
institutions also become mutually complementary. This is defined by 
Aoki(1995) as institutional complementarity. Because of this, the economic 
system consisting of mutually complementary institutional rrangements may 
be difficult to change. Similarly, under the assumption that social 
conventions or norms are selected as mutually complementary equilibrium 
strategies through repeated interaction among a large number of agents, this
'For further discussion
. see Kalai and Lehrer (1993) and Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993).
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is also difficult to change. However, this does not necessarily imply that only 
one kind of behavior pattern can survive in the long run. In a class of games 
where strategies of players are complements in the sense that maginal 
profitability of a player increases with the strategies of his opponents, is 
called a supermodular game, equilibrium is likely to be multiple. This 
explains the possibility of the diversity of behavior patterns across societies. 
Here, let us define the supermodular games in a formal way.
 (l )The set of 'players The set of players i  a finite set I = {1,2,. ..  n} 
 (2)The set of ' strategies available to player i The set of strategies 
available to player i is a compact interval A, = ta,, a; Iwhose g neric element 
is denoted bya,. Suppose that A, is complete lattice, i.e., it is a partially 
ordered set with a maximal element and a minimal element and for all 
nonempty subset A', c A, inf(A',) EiA and sup(AI)EA.. 
 (3)The payoff to player i Suppose that payoff 7r, to player l is 
   supermodular, i.e., 
for all a,a' E A , define a „a'= inf {a,a'} and a v a'= sup{a,a'}, 
                1r,(a)+2r,(a') <_)r,(aAa')+Jr,(ava') .
 The following Characterization Theorem presents necessary and sufficient 
condition for a twice continuously differentiable function to be 
supermodular.
Fact 6.1 (the Topkis's Characterization The rem) Let i= [x, x] be an 
interval in R" . Suppose that f : R" --* R is twice continuously differentiable 
on some open set containing I. Then f is supermodular on I if and only if 
for all x EI and all I # j, elf /a,a, >_o. 
 The following Monotonicity Theorem states that the maximizer of 
supermodular function is monotone nondecreasing  a parameter.
Fact 6.2 (the Topkis's Monotonicity Theorem) Let S, be a lattice and S., a 
partially ordered set. Suppose f (x, y): S, x S, --- R is supermodular in x for 
given y and has increasing dijjerences in x and y. Suppose that y >_ y' and 
that x e M - arg max f (x, y) and x' c M' - arg max f (x, y') . Then inf {x, x'} e M' 
and sup {x, x'} E M . In particular when y = y , the set of 'maxim izers of ' f is
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a sublattice.
 The following Fixed Point Theorem states that a monotone nondecrease 
function from a complete lattice to itself has at least one fixed point.
Fact 6.3 (the Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem) If T is a complete lattice and 
f : T -). T is a nondecreasing function, then f has affixed point. Moreover, 
the set of fixed points of f has sup (x E 71f(x) >_ x) as its largest and 
inf {x c= 71 f (x) _< x} as its smallest lement.
  Second and third facts together ensure the existence of equilibrium in 
pure strategy in supermodular games. It, however, is not necessarily implies 
that equilibrium is unique. The following fact provides the upper and lower 
bounds of the set of equilibria.
Fact 6.4 Let t be a supermodular game. Then there exists a pure Nash 
equilibrium. Moreover, there exist largest and smallest pure Nash 
equil ibriua in the given order.
The following fact is useful to evaluate an equilibrium point from the 
welfare point of view.
Fact 6.5 (the Welfare Theorem) Let a, and a; be the smallest and largest 
elements of A. and suppose a* and a' are two equilibria with a` > a«' 
(1) If ii (ai , a_i) is increasing in a_t , hen i (a*) >_ rri (a`') . 
(2) If 7i (ai , a_i) is decreasing in a, ,then 
If the condition in (1) holds for some subset of players N, and the condition 
in (2) holds for the reminder N, / N, then the largest equilibrium isthe mostt 
preferred equilibrium for player in N, and the least preferred for the 
remaining players, while smallest equilibrium is least preferred by the 
players in N, and most preferred by the remaining players.
 The following fact is a corollary of the Welfare Theorem and states that if 
the game has a unique equilibrium in pure strategy in pure strategy then the 
equilibrium is the Pareto-best. Although this is a desirable property of
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supermoduler game, existence of unique equilibrium in general requires 
strong assumption.
Fact 6.6 Let r be a supermodular game. If the game r has a unique pure 
Nash equilibrium, then t is dominance solvable, i.e., all players are 
indifferent between all outcomes that survive the iterative procedure in 
which all weakly dominated strategies of each player are eliminated at each 
stage.
   Note that as pointed by Milgrom and Roberts (1990), if the game is a 
smooth supennodular game with continuously differential payoff function 
and an equilibrium point is interior of the set of strategies for all agents, even 
Pareto-best equilibrium is not Pareto optimum. As a simple example of such 
game, we can think of 2-person Cournot game where a Nash equilibrium 
remains after the iterated elimination of dominated strategies but it is not 
Pareto optimum.
7. Conclusions
  And the outline of each section is as follows. Section 2and 3 are devoted 
to comparison of interpretations of social convention and norm by 
economists and game theorists with that by other social scientists. A social 
convention and norm have been studied not only by economists but also 
other social scientists and there has been much difference between their 
definitions. Specifically, economists regards economic phenomena observed 
in the real economy as consequences of agents' choice subject to physical 
and institutional constraints, e.g., endowment, technology, market power and 
so on. And they interpret social conventions and norms in the same way. On 
the other hand, other social scientists define it as orientations by which 
individuals are guided. That is, they interpret them to be constraints on 
agents' decision-making. Wecall the former "equilibrium analysis" and the 
latter "philosophycal study" . 
  Section 4 and 5 are devoted to presentation f two analytical tools which 
play the key role in our analysis. First one is the Folk Theorem in the theory
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of repeated games. This states that efficient cooperation can be supported as 
an equilibrium outcome in non-cooperative games. 
 Second one is the concept of evolutionarily stability in the theory of 
evolutionary game. The fact that evolutionarily stable equilibrium is Nash 
equilibrium iscalled by Samuelson and Zhang (1992) and Samuelson (1994) 
 "stability or convergence implies Nash theorem" and a version of the Folk 
Theorem of evolutionary games. 
 Section 6is devoted to presentation f the concept of "complementarity" . 
Complementarity between strategic choices of agents has been found in the 
Japanese management system, e.g., "lifetime mployment" and "enterprise 
unionism" in the employer-employee relationship, "seniority pay" in wage 
structure and promotion system and "mutual stockholding" in corporate 
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